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There is a growing concern about anonymity and privacy on the Internet, resulting in
lots of work on formalization and verification of anonymity. In particular, the importance
of probabilistic aspects of anonymity has recently been highlighted by many authors.
Several different notions of ‘‘probabilistic anonymity’’ have been studied so far, but proof
methods for such probabilistic notions have not yet been elaborated. In this paper we
introduce a simulation-based proof method for one notion of probabilistic anonymity
introduced by Bhargava and Palamidessi, called strong probabilistic anonymity. Themethod
is a probabilistic adaptation of the one by Kawabe, Sakurada et al. for non-deterministic
anonymity; anonymity of a protocol is proved by finding a forward/backward simulation
between certain automata. For the jump from non-determinism to probability we exploit
a generic, coalgebraic theory of traces and simulations developed by Hasuo, Jacobs and
Sokolova. In particular, an appropriate notion of probabilistic simulation is obtained as
an instantiation of the generic definition, for which soundness theorem comes for free.
Additionally, we show how we can use a similar idea to verify a weaker notion of
probabilistic anonymity called probable innocence.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Nowadays more and more human activities are relying critically on communication on the Internet, hence on
communication protocols. This has made verification of communication protocols a trend in computer science. At the same
time, varying purposes of communication protocols have identified new verification goals – or security properties – such as
anonymity, in addition to rather traditional ones like secrecy and authentication.
Anonymity properties have attracted growing concern from the public. There are emerging threats as well: for example,
the European Parliament in December 2005 approved rules forcing ISPs to retain access records. Consequently an increasing
extent of research activities – especially from the formal methods community – are aiming at verification of anonymity
properties (see [3]).
Formal verification of anonymity properties is at its relative youth compared to authentication or secrecy. The topic still
allows for definitional work (such as [5,8,17,19,26,33]) pointing out many different aspects of anonymity notions. Notably
many authors [5,8,19,40,41] claim the significant role of probability in anonymity notions. This is the focus of this paper.
I An earlier version Hasuo and Kawabe (2007) [24] of this paper was presented at the 16th European Symposium on Programming (ESOP 2007), Braga,
Portugal, March 2007.∗ Corresponding address: Research Institute for Mathematical Sciences, Kyoto University, 606-8502, Japan. Tel.: +81 75 753 7251; fax: +81 75 753 7266.
E-mail addresses: ichiro@kurims.kyoto-u.ac.jp (I. Hasuo), kawabe@aitech.ac.jp (Y. Kawabe), sakurada@theory.brl.ntt.co.jp (H. Sakurada).
URLs: http://www.kurims.kyoto-u.ac.jp/∼ichiro (I. Hasuo), http://aitech.ac.jp/∼kawabe (Y. Kawabe), http://www.brl.ntt.co.jp/people/sakurada
(H. Sakurada).
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There have been several different notions of anonymity proposed in probabilistic settings; e.g. [34,19,5]. There are also
some case studies which have analyzed existing anonymizing protocols to see whether they satisfy these notions of proba-
bilistic anonymity. However, generic verificationmethods for probabilistic anonymity have not yet been greatly elaborated.
In this paperwe introduce simulation-based proofmethods for two different notions of probabilistic anonymity. The first
one is strong probabilistic anonymity (whichwill be also called strong anonymity) introduced by Bhargava and Palamidessi [5];
the other one is probable innocence found, for example, in [34,19]. Strong anonymity requires that, by observing an execution
of the protocol, the adversary should gain absolutely no information on the person to be blamed – the culprit. The notion is
a natural probabilistic extension of the non-deterministic notion of trace anonymity.1
What we shall do in this paper is to extend a proof method as well, from the one for (non-deterministic) trace anonymity
to the one for probabilistic strong anonymity. The proof method we start with is the simulation-based one which is
introduced in [28,27]. Its basic scenario is as follows.
(1) First we model an anonymizing protocol to be verified as a certain kind of automatonX.
(2) Second we construct the anonymized version an(X) of X. The automaton an(X) satisfies the appropriate notion of
anonymity because of the way it is constructed.
(3) We prove that
(trace semantics ofX) = (trace semantics of an(X)).
Then, since the notion of anonymity is defined in terms of traces, anonymity of an(X) yields anonymity of X. The
equality is proved by showing that the (appropriate notion of) inclusion orderv holds in both directions.
• v holds because of the construction of an(X).
• w is provedby finding a (forward or backward) simulation from an(X) toX. Herewe appeal to the soundness theorem
for simulations — existence of a simulation implies trace inclusion.
Hence the anonymity proof ofX is reduced to finding a suitable forward/backward simulation.
The basic scenario remains the same for strong (probabilistic) anonymity. However, there is an obvious difficulty in
conducting it in a probabilistic setting. The theory of traces and simulations in a non-deterministic setting is well studied
(e.g. by [29]); however appropriate definitions of probabilistic traces and simulations are far from trivial.
For the jump from non-determinism to probability we exploit a generic, coalgebraic theory of traces and simulations
developed byHasuo, Jacobs and Sokolova [20,23]. In the generic theory, fundamental notions such as system (or automaton),
trace semantics and forward/backward simulation are identified as certain kinds of coalgebraic constructs. On this level of
abstraction the general soundness theorem – existence of a (coalgebraic) simulation yields (coalgebraic) trace inclusion – is
proved by categorical arguments.
The generic theory has two parameters appearing in it; by making different choices of these parameters the theory can
cover a wide variety of systems. In particular, according to the choice of one parameter, systems can be non-deterministic
or probabilistic.2 In this work we obtain a complex definition of probabilistic simulations as an instance of the general,
coalgebraic definition. Moreover, this definition is an appropriate one: soundness theorem comes for free from the general
soundness theorem.
After presenting a simulation-based proof method for strong (probabilistic) anonymity, we use a similar idea to verify
a weaker anonymity notion called probable innocence. The notion appears in [34,19] and is extensively studied in [9]. The
significance of this weaker notion is due to the fact that many anonymizing protocols – such as Crowds [34] – do not satisfy
strong anonymity but do satisfy probable innocence. Intuitively, probable innocence does allow the adversary to learn some
information about the culprit; but it requires that this information leak is only up to a certain bound.
We take the definition in [9] – which generalizes the ones in [34,19] – and present a simulation-based proof method for
this notion. Although the basic scenario is not exactly the same as before, the idea about using simulations is quite similar.
1.1. Outline of the paper
In Section 2 we illustrate notions of probabilistic anonymity using a couple of examples. They include the Dining
Cryptographers protocol and the Crowds protocol. The formal definitions of anonymity notions are presented in Section 3,
where we also introduce our models of anonymizing protocols called anonymity automata. In Section 4 we describe our
simulation-based proof method for strong anonymity and prove its correctness. In Section 5 the proof method for probable
innocence is described and applied to Crowds. The relation to other work with a similar interest is discussed in Section 6.
One remark on coalgebras and category theory: the paper is written in such a way that the reader should be able to
treat the coalgebraic theory of traces and simulations (and the category theory behind it) as a back-end. The correctness of
our proof method, however, does rely on the coalgebraic theory; hence some account on it is desirable in an effort to be
1 The notion of trace anonymity is originally introduced in [37] under the name of strong anonymity. In this paper we follow [28,27] and call it trace
anonymity. This is for the sake of terminological convenience.
2 Unfortunately the combination of both non-determinism and probability – which is, for example, in probabilistic automata [39] – is not covered in this
paper. We will come back to this point later in Section 6.3.
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self-contained and to justify the results. Unfortunately we find the categorical formalism employed therein is simply not
presentable in the current limited space; it makes little sense unless it is accompanied by ample illustration. The reader is
referred for the relevant coalgebraic theory to [20], which we believe serves this end.
1.2. Notations
In the sequel the disjoint union of sets X and Y is denoted by X + Y .
The set of lists in an alphabet X with length ≥ 1 is denoted by X+, that is, X+ = X∗ · X in a regular-expression-like
notation. This appears later as a domain of trace semantics for anonymity automata.
2. Motivating examples
In this section we motivate
• the probabilistic aspect of anonymity, and
• possible candidates for a formal notion of ‘‘probabilistic anonymity’’,
by presenting concrete examples of anonymizing protocols. The first example is thewell-knownDining Cryptographers (DC)
protocol [10]: this will illustrate the importance of probability in anonymizing protocols. The second example of simple and
artificial protocols for anonymous donation will clarify the idea behind the notion of strong probabilistic anonymity. Finally
we present an example of Crowds [34] – which does not satisfy strong probabilistic anonymity – to motivate the weaker
notion of probable innocence.
2.1. The Dining Cryptographers (DC) protocol
Here we follow [5] to illustrate the role of probability in anonymity, using the Dining Cryptographers (DC) protocol.
There are three cryptographers (or ‘‘users’’) dining together. The payment will be made either by one of the
cryptographers, or by NSA (U S National Security Agency) which organizes the dinner. Who is paying is determined by
NSA; if one of the cryptographers is paying, the payer has been told so beforehand.
The goal of the DC protocol is as follows. The three cryptographers
• should reveal whether there is a payer among them, but
• should not revealing who of them is the payer (if any),
to the observer (called the adversary in the sequel) and also to the cryptographers who are not paying. The second point is
where anonymity is involved.
The protocol proceeds in the following way. Three cryptographers Crypti for i = 0, 1, 2 sit in a circle, each with a coin
Coini. The coins are held in such a way that they can be seen by the owner and one of the other two: in the following figure
→ denotes the ‘‘able-to-see-her-coin’’ relation.
Crypt0 
Crypt1 2 Crypt2
j
Then the coins are flipped; each cryptographer, comparing the two coins she can see, announces to the public whether they
agree (showing the same side) or disagree. The trick is that the onewho is paying – if there is –must lie on the announcement.
For example, given that Crypt0 is paying, the configuration of coins
(h, t, h) that is h
t 8 h
m
,
results in the announcement
(a, d, a) that is
a
d 8 a
n
.
This announcement is the only thing the adversary can observe; occurrence of an odd number of d’s reveals the presence of
a liar, hence the presence of a payer among the cryptographers.
Can the adversary say which cryptographer is paying? No. In fact, given an announcement with an odd number of
d’s and any payer Crypti, we can construct a coin configuration which yields the given announcement. For example, the
announcement (a, d, a) above can be yielded by any of the following configurations.
Crypt0 pays, and coins are (h, t, h) or (t, h, t)
Crypt1 pays, and coins are (h, h, h) or (t, t, t)
Crypt2 pays, and coins are (h, h, t) or (t, t, h)
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2.2. Probabilistic anonymity in DC
Up to nowour arguments have been non-deterministic; nowwe shall explain howprobabilistic aspects inDC can emerge.
Assume that the coins are biased: each of three Coini’s gives head with the probability 9/10. Provided that Crypt0 is paying,
the announcement (a, d, a) occurs with the probability (9 · 1 · 9+ 1 · 9 · 1)/103, because it results from (h, t, h) or (t, h, t).
Similar calculations lead to the following table of conditional probabilities.
(d, a, a) (a, d, a) (a, a, d) (d, d, d)
Crypt0 pays 0.73 0.09 0.09 0.09
Crypt1 pays 0.09 0.73 0.09 0.09
Crypt2 pays 0.09 0.09 0.73 0.09
Are the cryptographers still ‘‘anonymous’’? We would not say so. For example, if the adversary observes an announcement
(d, a, a), it is reasonable for her to suspect Crypt0 more than the other two.
Nevertheless, if the coins are not biased, we cannot find any symptom of broken anonymity. Therefore we want to come
up with the following two things.
The first is an appropriate notion of ‘‘probabilistic anonymity’’ which holds with fair coins but is violated with biased
coins. This is done in [5] and will be explained using the next simpler example.
The second is an effective proof method to verify this notion of anonymity. This is what we aim at in the current work.
2.3. Strong probabilistic anonymity
In this section we present toy examples of probabilistic anonymizing protocols to motivate the notion of strong
(probabilistic) anonymity [5].
Let us think of a situation of anonymous donation: one of two cryptographers Crypt0 and Crypt1 tries to donate some
money, without revealing the donor’s identity. Consider the following three protocols,X0,X1,X2 from left to right.
It is assumed that the labels Crypti – deciding which cryptographer is the donor – are invisible for the observer. Only the
labels $n – for money transactions – are visible.
The first protocol X0 works as follows. First the donor is chosen with the uniform probability distribution; no matter
which is chosen, the donor donates $5 with the probability 9/10 and $10K with 1/10. In the second one X1, it is in the
specification of the protocol (hence is known to the adversary) that Crypt1 is more likely to be the donor – the culprit. InX2,
Crypt0 is known to be rich so to say: when she is chosen more often than not she gives away $10K .
Are these protocols ‘‘anonymous’’? That is, by observing money transactions, can the adversary tell who is the culprit?
Intuitively it is clear thatX0 should be ‘‘anonymous’’ andX2 should not be.X1 can be debatable but we want to claim it to
be anonymous. It is true that Crypt1 is inherently more suspicious than Crypt0 inX1 (the a priori distribution of suspicion
is not uniform). However, after observing any execution of the protocol, from the adversary’s viewpoint the cryptographers
look exactly as suspicious as before. In other words, an observation of transaction of $5 or $10K does not carry any information
on who is the culprit.
This intuition leads to the notion of strong anonymity introduced in [5]. Here we give an informal description; a formal
definition is found in Definition 3.8.
Definition 2.1 (Strong Anonymity). An anonymizing protocol X satisfies strong (probabilistic) anonymity if, for any
observation o and users i and j, we have
PX(o | i is a culprit) = PX(o | j is a culprit).
Here PX(o | i is a culprit) denotes the conditional probability for the event ‘‘given that the user i is the culprit, an execution
ofX yields the observation o’’.
The intuition behind this definition is quite similar to the one behind the notion of conditional anonymity [19] whose
formal definition is given later in Definition 3.9. In fact, it is shown in [5] that under reasonable assumptions these two
notions of anonymity coincide.
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2.4. Crowds and probable innocence
Although the DC protocol with fair coins, as well as the anonymous donation protocolsX0 and X1 in Section 2.3, satisfies
strong anonymity, there are a large body of real-world protocols which do not satisfy the property. Crowds [34] is one of
them.
The Crowds protocol aims at anonymous web browsing, so that a user can send a request to a web server without
revealing the user’s identity. In essence the identity is concealed by relaying the request among a set (‘‘crowd’’) of relays.
• A user, who has already joined a group (‘‘crowd’’) of hosts, picks one relay out of the crowd with a uniform probability
and forwards a request to the chosen relay. The relay can be the originating user herself.
• A relay in a crowd, on receiving a request, flips a (biased) coin to decide whether
. to deliver the request to its intended recipient; i.e. the web server (this happens with the probability 1− pf ), or
. to forward it to another relay (with the probability pf ). The next relay is chosen from the crowd with the uniform
probability, including the current relay itself.
Here the probability pf is a system-wide parameter. This way the web server only sees a request coming from a relay, hence
it is not sure from whom the request originated.
It is obvious that Crowds gives no anonymity guarantee against a global eavesdropper —an adversary capable of observing
all the network traffic. A more realistic attack scenario is that some of the relays are corrupt and cooperate with the adversary.
A short calculation shows the following. The fact that a certain host i has sent a request to a corrupt relay – although
the adversary cannot tell whether the host i is the originator of the request or is just forwarding it – makes the host i
probabilistically more suspicious for being the originator than the other hosts. This makes the strong anonymity fail: the
observation ‘‘i has sent a request to me’’ does carry some information on who is the originator.3
Still, when the number of relays (i.e. the cardinality of the crowd) is sufficiently bigger than that of corrupt relays, we
want to say that Crowds is ‘‘anonymous’’, that is, Crowds satisfies someweaker notion of anonymity that allows information
leak up to a certain amount. The notion of probable innocence is one candidate of such an anonymity notion.
Intuitively, probable innocence is satisfied if after any observation, the adversary can never have confidence exceeding 1/2
that someone is the culprit. In [34] it is shown that Crowds satisfies probable innocence if pf > 1/2 and the number N of
relays and the number c of corrupt relays satisfy4
N ≥ pf
pf − 12
(c + 1).
However, the above statement in [34] is only true if every user in the crowd is equally suspicious before an execution
of Crowds. Assume there is a user who is known to be a much more frequent originator of a request than other users; then
the above ‘‘confidence is ≤ 1/2’’ definition of probable innocence is more easily violated. The situation is similar to the
comparison betweenX0 andX1 in Section 2.3; wewant our definition robust to such a change of the a priori distribution of
suspicion. A user who is inherentlymore suspicious than others can still lookmore suspicious than others after an execution
of the protocol; a bit more than it did before an execution because now we allow some marginal information leak, but not
much more.
This idea led Chatzikokolakis and Palamidessi [9] to the following definition of probable innocence, which we formally
present later in Definition 3.11. It is also shown to coincide with the definitions in [34,19] under suitable assumptions.
Definition 2.2 (Probable Innocence). An anonymizing protocol X satisfies probable innocence if, for any observation o and
user iwe have
(n− 1) PX(i is a culprit)∑
j6=i
PX(j is a culprit)
≥ PX(i is a culprit | o)∑
j6=i
PX(j is a culprit | o)
. (1)
Here n is the number of users who can possibly be a culprit; we are assuming that two different users cannot be culprits at
the same time.
3 Strong anonymity is satisfied if no relay in the crowd is corrupt. In this case, the adversary, when it receives a request from a host i, can tell for sure
that i is forwarding the request. Hence the host i is no more suspicious than the other hosts.
4 In fact, the definition of probable innocence used in [34] is slightly different from this one which is based on the definition in [19]. These two are shown
in [9] to coincide under some mild conditions.
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The left-hand side of (1) is about the a priori distribution of suspicion. To get an idea let us assume that the apriori distribution
is uniform. Then (1) becomes
1 ≥ PX(i is a culprit | o)∑
j6=i
PX(j is a culprit | o)
.
If we moreover assume that the observation o reveals existence of a culprit, that is,∑
i
PX(i is a culprit | o) = 1,
the condition is equivalent to 1/2 ≥ PX(i is a culprit | o). In this waywe can recover the original definition: ‘‘the adversary’s
confidence does not exceed 1/2’’.
3. Formalizing notions for probabilistic anonymity
3.1. Anonymity automata: Models of anonymizing protocols
In this work anonymizing protocols are formalized as a specific kind of probabilistic systems which we shall call
(probabilistic) anonymity automata. The notion is similar to probabilistic automata [39]. However, in anonymity automata,
branching is purely probabilistic without any non-determinism. This modification, together with other minor ones, is made
so that the coalgebraic framework in [20] applies.
The features of an anonymity automaton are as follows.
• By making a transition it can either
. execute an action and successfully terminate (x
a→ X), or
. execute an action and move to another state (x
a→ y).
Internal, silent actions are not explicitly present.
• An action a can be either
. an observable action owhich can be seen by the adversary, or
. an actor action act(i)which means that a user i is chosen as the culprit.
• Each state comes with a probability subdistribution over the set of possible transitions. By ‘‘sub’’distribution it is meant
that the sum of all the probabilities is ≤ 1 rather than = 1: the missing probability is understood as the probability for
deadlock.
Here is a formal definition.
Definition 3.1 (Anonymity Automata). An anonymity automaton is a 5-tuple (X,U,O, c, s)where:
• X is a non-empty set called the state space.
• U is a non-empty set of users.5
• O is a non-empty set of observable actions.
• c : X → D(A × {X} + A × X) is a function which assigns to each state x ∈ X a probability subdistribution c(x) over
possible transitions. The setA is the set of actions and defined by
A = O + { act(i) | i ∈ U}.
The operationD gives the set of subdistributions: for a set Y ,
DY =
{
d : Y → [0, 1] |
∑
y∈Y
d(y) ≤ 1
}
. (2)
This operationD canonically extends to a monad6 which we shall call the subdistribution monad.
For example, the value c(x)(a,X)7 in [0, 1] is the probability with which a state x executes a and then successfully
terminate (i.e. x
a→ X).
• s ∈ DX is a probability subdistribution over the state space X . This specifies which state would be a starting (or initial)
one.
5 A user is called an anonymous user in [5].
6 Monads are a categorical notion. Interested readers are referred to [4] for the details.
7 To be precise this should be written as c(x)
(
κ1(a,X)
)
, where κ1 : A× {X} → A× {X} +A× X is the inclusion map.
I. Hasuo et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 411 (2010) 2239–2259 2245
Example 3.2 (Anonymity AutomatonXDC for DC). To model the DC protocol, we take
U = {0, 1, 2}, O = {a, d} × {a, d} × {a, d} = {(x, y, z) | x, y, z ∈ {a, d}}.
We need to fix the a priori probability distribution on who will make a payment. Let us denote by pi the probability with
which the user i pays.
The DC protocol (with its a priori probability distribution given by pi’s) is naturally described as follows. Probability for
each transition is presented in square brackets; otherwise the transition occurs with probability 1.
Here τ denotes an internal action with the intention of ‘‘NSA pays’’.
However, the actions hi and ti – with their obvious meanings – must not be present because they are not observable
by the adversary. These actions are replaced by τ ’s. Moreover, for technical simplicity we do not allow τ ’s to appear in an
anonymity automaton. Hence we take the ‘‘closure’’ of the above automaton in an obvious way, and obtain the following.
The start state distribution s is: x 7→ 1. This anonymity automaton we shall refer to asXDC.
3.2. Anonymity automata reconciled as coalgebras
The generic, coalgebraic theory of traces and simulations in [20,23] applies to anonymity automata.8 The generic theory
is developed with two parameters T and F :
• a monad T on Sets specifies the branching-type, such as non-determinism or probability;
• a functor F on Sets specifies the transition-type, i.e., what a system can do by making a transition.
Systems for which traces/simulations are defined are called (T , F)-systems in the generic theory, making the parameters
explicit. The theory is coalgebraic because a (T , F)-system is essentially a coalgebra in a suitable category.
Anonymity automata fit in this generic framework. They are (T , F)-systems with the following choice of parameters T
and F .
• T is the subdistribution monadD , modeling purely probabilistic branching.
• FX = A× {X} +A× X , modeling the transition-type of ‘‘(action and terminate) or (action and next state)’’.
8 As explained in Section 1.1, the reader can safely take the relevant (categorical) theory of coalgebras as a back-end and ignore its details for the rest of
the paper.
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It is immediately seen that for this choice of F , the setA+ carries the following initial algebra in Sets. We denote its structure
map by α.
A× {X} +A×A+
∼=α 
κ1(a,X)_

κ2(a, Ea)_

A+ 〈a〉 a · Ea ,
where 〈a〉 denotes a list of length 1, and a ·Ea is whatwould bewritten as (cons a Ea) in the Lisp-style. Therefore [20, Corollary
5.2] suggests that the setA+ is the appropriate ‘‘domain’’ of (finite) trace semantics for anonymity automata; this is actually
the case later in Definition 3.3.9
3.3. Trace semantics for anonymity automata
Trace semantics for anonymity automata is used in defining probabilistic notions of anonymity. In a non-deterministic
setting, trace semantics yield a set of lists (‘‘traces’’) of actions which can possibly occur during an execution. In contrast,
trace semantics of a probabilistic system is given by a probability subdistribution over lists.
Definition 3.3 (Trace Semantics for Anonymity Automata). Given an anonymity automaton X = (X,U,O, c, s), its trace
semantics
PX ∈ D(A+)
is defined as follows. For a list of actions 〈a0, a1, . . . , an〉with a finite length n ≥ 1,
PX(〈a0, a1, . . . , an〉) =
∑
x0,x1,...,xn∈X
PX(x0
a0→ x1 a1→ · · · an−1→ xn an→ X),
where the probability
PX(x0
a0→ x1 a1→ · · · an−1→ xn an→ X) = s(x0) · c(x0)(a0, x1) · · · · · c(xn−1)(an−1, xn) · c(xn)(an,X)
is for the event that an execution ofX starts at x0, follows the path
a0→ x1 a1→ · · · an−1→ xn and finally terminates with an→ X.
Intuitively the value PX(Ea) ∈ [0, 1] for a list Ea ∈ A+ is the probability with which the system X executes actions in Ea
successively and then terminates. Our concern is on actions (observable actions or actor actions) the system makes but not
on the states it exhibits.
The following alternative characterization allows us to apply the generic, coalgebraic theory of traces in [20,23].
Lemma 3.4 (Trace Semantics via the Generic Theory). Given an anonymity automatonX, let (s, c) be a (T , F)-system identified
withX as in Section 3.2.
The trace semantics PX ofX coincides with the coalgebraic trace semantics tr(s,c) defined in the generic theory [20, Definition
5.7] for (s, c). 
Example 3.5 (Dining Cryptographers). For the anonymity automaton XDC in Example 3.2, its trace semantics PXDC is the
following probability subdistribution.
〈 act(i), (d, a, a) 〉 7→ pi/4
〈 act(i), (a, d, a) 〉 7→ pi/4
〈 act(i), (a, a, d) 〉 7→ pi/4
〈 act(i), (d, d, d) 〉 7→ pi/4
〈 (a, a, a) 〉 7→ (1− p0 − p1 − p2)/4
〈 (a, d, d) 〉 7→ (1− p0 − p1 − p2)/4
〈 (d, a, d) 〉 7→ (1− p0 − p1 − p2)/4
〈 (d, d, a) 〉 7→ (1− p0 − p1 − p2)/4
(for i = 0, 1, 2)
The other lists inA+ have probability 0.
In this work we assume that in each execution of an anonymizing protocol there appears at most one actor action. This
is the same assumption as [5, Assumption 1] and is true in all the examples in this paper.10
Assumption 3.6 (At Most One Actor Action). LetX = (X,U,O, c, s) be an anonymity automaton and Ea ∈ A+. If Ea contains
more than one actor actions, then we have PX(Ea) = 0.
9 To be precise, the setA+ is that of all possible traces. This is the same for both non-deterministic and probabilistic settings. What is different in these
two is whether trace semantics is given by a set of traces or a probability distribution over traces.
10 Relaxing the assumption is desired in order to analyze a situation where an anonymizing protocol has multiple runs simultaneously. Now it is unclear
even how to adapt the anonymity notions.
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3.4. Notions of probabilistic anonymity
In this sectionwe formalize the twodifferent notions of probabilistic anonymity, namely strong (probabilistic) anonymity
[5] and probable innocence [34,19,9].
First, for the sake of simplicity of presentation, we shall introduce the following notations for predicates (i.e. subsets)
onA+.
Definition 3.7 (Predicates [act(i)] and [Eo]).
• For each i ∈ U, a predicate [act(i)] onA+ is defined as follows. In a regular-expression-like notation,
[act(i)] = O∗ · act(i) · O∗,
that is, it is the set of lists which contains only one actor action which is act(i). Obviously we have [act(i)] ∩ [act(j)] = ∅
if i 6= j.
• For each Eo ∈ O∗, a predicate [Eo] onA+ is defined as follows.
[Eo] = {Ea ∈ A+ | removeActor(Ea) = Eo},
where the function removeActor : A+ → O∗ – which is defined by a suitable induction – removes actor actions appear-
ing in a list. Hence the set [Eo] ⊆ A+ consists of those lists which yield Eo as the adversary’s observation. It is emphasized
that [Eo] is not the set of lists which contain Eo as sublists; we remove only actor actions, but not observable actions.
Note that we are overriding the notation [ ]; no confusion would arise since the arguments are of different types. Values
such as PX( [act(i)] ) are defined in a straightforward manner:
PX( [act(i)] ) =
∑
Ea∈[act(i)]
PX(Ea).
This is the probability with whichX yields an execution in which a user i is a culprit.
3.4.1. Strong (probabilistic) anonymity
Based on anonymity automata as models of anonymity protocols, we shall formalize the notion of strong anonymity
which is informally introduced in Definition 2.1.
Definition 3.8 (Strong Anonymity [5]). We say an anonymity automaton X satisfies strong anonymity if, for each i, j ∈ U
and Eo ∈ O∗,
PX( [act(i)] ) > 0 ∧ PX( [act(j)] ) > 0
=⇒ PX( [Eo] | [act(i)] ) = PX( [Eo] | [act(j)] ).
Here PX( [Eo] | [act(i)] ) is a conditional probability: it is given by
PX( [Eo] | [act(i)] ) = PX( [Eo] ∩ [act(i)] )PX( [act(i)] ) .
It is shown in [5] that under reasonable assumptions this notion coincides with conditional anonymity [19], whose formal
definition we present now for completeness.
Definition 3.9 (Conditional Anonimity [19]). An anonymity automaton X satisfies conditional anonymity if for each i ∈ U
and Eo ∈ O∗,
PX( [act(i)] ∩ [Eo] ) > 0
=⇒ PX( [act(i)] | [Eo] ) = PX
(
[act(i)] |
⋃
j∈U
[act(j)]
)
.
The notion in Definition 3.8 is a natural probabilistic extension of trace anonymity in [37]. It is emphasized that these
anonymity notions are based on trace semanticswhich is at the coarsest end in the linear time-branching time spectrum [18].
Hence our adversary has less observation power than one in [1] for example where security notions are bisimulation-based.
A justification for having such a weaker adversary is found in [28].
It is noted that in the current work, the adversary’s observation (Eo in Definition 3.8 and elsewhere) is a finite sequence
of observable actions which leads to termination X. This choice is made for a technical reason: the coalgebraic trace
semantics in [20,23] assigns probabilities only to finite sequences; hence so does our current definition of trace semantics
(Definition 3.3). This rules out infinite traces (infinite streams of observable actions) from our consideration and is
problematic; e.g. in the following protocol.
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In this protocol an occurrence of o0 (or o1) immediately reveals that the culprit is the user 0 (or the user 1, respectively).
However due to Definition 3.8 the protocol is still anonymous because it does not take infinite traces (like oω0 ) or incomplete
traces (like on0) into account.
This leads to the following assumption.
Assumption 3.10 (No Infinite Traces). There are no infinite traces in an anonymity automaton X. More precisely, an
execution of the automatonX leads to termination with probability 1:
∑
Ea∈A+ PX(Ea) = 1.
The assumption is trivially satisfied when there is no infinite path inX. Unfortunately this stronger condition fails for our
Crowds example (Section 5.3).
3.4.2. Probable innocence
Theweaker notion of probable innocence – informally introduced inDefinition 2.2 – is also formalized based on anonymity
automata and their trace semantics. It is based on the definition in [9].
Definition 3.11 (Probable Innocence [9]). We say an anonymity automatonX satisfies probable innocence if, for each i ∈ U
and Eo ∈ O∗,
• Neither of the probabilities PX(⋃j6=i[act(j)]) and PX(⋃j6=i[act(j)] | [Eo] ) is 0. These appear as denominators in the
following inequality.
• We have
(n− 1) PX( [act(i)] )
PX(
⋃
j6=i
[act(j)]) ≥
PX( [act(i)] | [Eo] )
PX(
⋃
j6=i
[act(j)] | [Eo] ) . (3)
Here n = |U| is the number of users.
4. Verifying strong anonymity via probabilistic simulations
In this section we extend the proof method [28,27] for (non-deterministic) trace anonymity to the probabilistic setting
for strong (probabilistic) anonymity. In the introduction we have presented the basic scenario. Now we shall describe its
details, with all the notions therein (traces, simulations, etc.) interpreted probabilistically.
4.1. Anonymized automaton an(X)
We start with the definition of an(X), the anonymized version of an anonymity automaton X. Recall that the notion
of strong anonymity is conditional: the adversary has a priori knowledge on who is more suspicious. In an anonymity
automaton X, the a priori probability with which a user i is a culprit is given by PX( [act(i)] ). Its normalized, conditional
version
ri
def.= PX
(
[act(i)] |
⋃
j∈U
[act(j)]
)
=
PX( [act(i)] ∩
⋃
j∈U
[act(j)] )
PX(
⋃
j∈U
[act(j)] )
= PX( [act(i)] )∑
j∈U
PX( [act(j)] )
(4)
(the equalities are due to Assumption 3.6) plays an important role in the following definition of an(X). The value ri is the
conditional probability with which a user i is a culprit, given that there is any culprit; we have
∑
i∈U ri = 1. Of course, for
the values ri to be well-defined, the anonymity automatonX needs to satisfy the following reasonable assumption.
Assumption 4.1 (There Can be a Culprit). For an anonymity automatonX,∑
j∈U
PX( [act(j)] ) 6= 0.
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Intuitively, an(X) is obtained fromX by distributing the probability for an actor action act(i) to each user j in proportion
to rj.
Definition 4.2 (Anonymized Anonymity Automaton an(X)). Given an anonymity automaton X = (X,U,O, c, s), its ano-
nymized automaton an(X) is a 5-tuple (X,U,O, can, s), where can is defined as follows. For each x ∈ X ,
can(x)(act(i), u) =
∑
j∈U
ri · c(x)(act(j), u) for i ∈ U and u ∈ {X} + X ,
can(x)(o, u) = c(x)(o, u) for o ∈ O and u ∈ {X} + X .
Here ri is the a priori suspicion defined in (4). On the first equation, the summand ri · c(x)(act(j), u) results from dis-
tributing the probability c(x)(act(j), u) for a transition x
act(j)−→ u, to a user i. This is illustrated in the following figure: here
U = {0, 1, . . . , n− 1} and q = c(x)(act(j), u).
(5)
The automaton an(X) is ‘‘anonymized’’ in the sense of the following lemmas.
Lemma 4.3. LetX be an anonymity automaton. In its anonymized version an(X) = (X,U,O, can, s) we have
rj · can(x)(act(i), u) = ri · can(x)(act(j), u)
for any i, j ∈ U, x ∈ X and u ∈ {X} + X.
Proof. Obvious from the definition of can. 
Lemma 4.4 (an(X) Satisfies Strong Anonymity). Given an anonymity automaton X, its anonymized version an(X) satisfies
strong anonymity in the sense of Definition 3.8.
Proof. Let Eo = 〈o1, o2, . . . , on〉 ∈ O∗ and i, j ∈ U. Moreover, assume
Pan(X)( [act(i)] ) 6= 0 and Pan(X)( [act(j)] ) 6= 0,
hence ri 6= 0 and rj 6= 0. Then
Pan(X)( [Eo] ∩ [act(i)] )
= Pan(X)( 〈act(i), o1, o2, . . . , on〉 )+ Pan(X)( 〈o1, act(i), o2, . . . , on〉 )
+ · · · + Pan(X)( 〈o1, o2, . . . , on, act(i)〉 )
=
∑
x0,x1,...,xn∈X
s(x0) · can(x0)(act(i), x1) · can(x1)(o1, x2) · · · · · can(xn)(on,X)
+
∑
x0,x1,...,xn∈X
s(x0) · can(x0)(o1, x1) · can(x1)(act(i), x2) · · · · · can(xn)(on,X)
+ · · ·
+
∑
x0,x1,...,xn∈X
s(x0) · can(x0)(o1, x1) · can(x1)(o2, x2) · · · · · can(xn)(act(i),X).
We have the same equation for j instead of i. Hence by Lemma 4.3 we have
rj · Pan(X)( [Eo] ∩ [act(i)] ) = ri · Pan(X)( [Eo] ∩ [act(j)] ). (6)
This is used to show the equality of two conditional probabilities.
Pan(X)( [Eo] | [act(i)] ) = Pan(X)( [Eo] ∩ [act(i)] )Pan(X)( [act(i)] )
= ri
rj
· Pan(X)( [Eo] ∩ [act(j)] )
Pan(X)( [act(i)] ) by (6)
= Pan(X)( [Eo] ∩ [act(j)] )
Pan(X)( [act(j)] ) by definition of ri, rj
= Pan(X)( [Eo] | [act(j)] ). 
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4.2. Forward/backward simulations for anonymity automata
We proceed to introduce appropriate notions of forward and backward simulations. The (tedious) definition and
soundness theorem – existence of a forward/backward simulation implies trace inclusion – come for free from the generic
theory in [20]. This forms a crucial part of our simulation-based proof method.
Definition 4.5 (Forward/Backward Simulations For Anonymity Automata). LetX = (X,U,O, c, s) and Y = (Y ,U,O, d, t)
be anonymity automata which have the same sets of users and observable actions.
A forward simulation fromX to Y – through which Y forward-simulatesX – is a function
f : Y −→ DX
which satisfies the following inequalities in [0, 1].
s(x) ≤
∑
y∈Y
t(y) · f (y)(x) for any x ∈ X ,∑
x∈X
f (y)(x) · c(x)(e,X) ≤ d(y)(e,X) for any y ∈ Y and e ∈ A,∑
x∈X
f (y)(x) · c(x)(e, x′) ≤
∑
y′∈Y
d(y)(e, y′) · f (y′)(x′) for any y ∈ Y , e ∈ A and x′ ∈ X .
A backward simulation fromX to Y – through which Y backward-simulatesX – is a function
b : X −→ DY
which satisfies the following inequalities in [0, 1].∑
x∈X
s(x) · b(x)(y) ≤ t(y) for any y ∈ Y ,
c(x)(e,X) ≤
∑
y∈Y
b(x)(y) · d(y)(e,X) for any x ∈ X and e ∈ A,∑
x′∈X
c(x)(e, x′) · b(x′)(y′) ≤
∑
y∈Y
b(x)(y) · d(y)(e, y′) for any x ∈ X , e ∈ A and y′ ∈ Y .
The definition looks puzzling. Why is a forward simulation a function of the type Y → DX? Why is a backward simulation
not of the same type? What is the reason for the complex inequalities? How do we know that the inequalities are in the
correct direction?
In fact, this definition is an instantiation of the general, coalgebraic notions of forward/backward simulations [20,
Definitions 4.1, 4.2]. More specifically, the two parameters T and F in the generic definition are instantiated as in Section 3.2.
Theorem 4.6 (Soundness of Forward/Backward Simulations). Assume there is a forward (or backward) simulation from one
anonymity automatonX to another Y. Then we have trace inclusion
PX v PY,
where the orderv is defined to be the pointwise order: for each Ea ∈ A+,
PX(Ea) ≤ PY(Ea).
Proof. We know (Lemma 3.4) that the notions of trace semantics and simulation for anonymity automata are instantiations
of the general, coalgebraic notions in [20,23]. Therefore we can appeal to the general soundness theorem [20, Theorem
6.1]. 
4.3. Probabilistic anonymity via simulations
We shall use the materials in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 to prove the validity of our simulation-based proof method
(Theorem 4.11).
The following lemma – which essentially says PX v Pan(X) – relies on the way the automaton an(X) is constructed. The
proof is a bit more complicated here than in the non-deterministic setting [28,27].
Lemma 4.7. Let X be an anonymity automaton. Assume there exists a forward or backward simulation from an(X) to X –
through whichX simulates an(X). Then their trace semantics are equal:
PX = Pan(X).
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Proof. By the soundness theorem (Theorem 4.6) we have
PX w Pan(X), (7)
where w refers to the pointwise order between functions A+ ⇒ [0, 1]. We shall show that this inequality is in fact an
equality.
First we introduce an operation obs which acts on anonymity automata. Intuitively, obs(Y) is obtained from Y by
replacing all the different actor actions act(i) with single act(sb) – sb is for ‘‘somebody’’. This conceals actor actions in Y;
hence obs(Y) only carries information on the observable actions of Y.
(8)
Formally,
Definition 4.8 (Anonymity Automaton obs(Y)). Given an anonymity automaton Y = (Y ,U,O, d, t), we define an ano-
nymity automaton obs(Y) as the 5-tuple (Y , {sb},O, dobs, t)where:
• sb is a fresh entity,
• dobs is a function
dobs : Y −→ D(Aobs × {X} +Aobs × Y)
whereAobs = O + {act(sb)}, defined by:
dobs(y)(act(sb), u) =
∑
i∈U
d(y)(act(i), u) for y ∈ Y and u ∈ {X} + Y ,
dobs(y)(o, u) = d(y)(o, u) for y ∈ Y , o ∈ O and u ∈ {X} + Y .
The following fact is obvious.
Sublemma 4.9. Given an anonymity automatonX, the two automata obs(X) and obs(an(X)) are identical. 
The following sublemma is crucial in the proof of Lemma 4.7. Two automata Y and obs(Y), although their trace semantics
distributes over different sets, have the same sum of probabilities taken over all executions.
Sublemma 4.10. For an anonymity automaton Y,∑
Ea∈A+
PY(Ea) =
∑
Ea′∈(Aobs)+
Pobs(Y)(Ea′).
Recall thatA = O + {act(i) | i ∈ U} andAobs = O + {act(sb)}.
Proof. From the definition of trace semantics (Definition 3.3), the sublemma is proved by easy calculation. 
We turn back to the proof of Lemma 4.7. We argue by contradiction – assume that the inequality in (7) is strict. That is,
there exists Ea0 ∈ A+ such that PX(Ea0)  Pan(X)(Ea0). Then, by (7) we have∑Ea∈A+ PX(Ea) ∑Ea∈A+ Pan(X)(Ea). However,∑
Ea∈A+
PX(Ea) =
∑
Ea′∈(Aobs)+
Pobs(X)(Ea′) by Sublemma 4.10
=
∑
Ea′∈(Aobs)+
Pobs(an(X))(Ea′) by Sublemma 4.9
=
∑
Ea∈A+
Pan(X)(Ea) by Sublemma 4.10.
This contradiction concludes the proof of Lemma 4.7. 
Now we are ready to state our main result for verifying strong anonymity.
Theorem 4.11 (Strong Anonymity via Simulations). If there exists a forward or backward simulation from an(X) toX, thenX
satisfies strong anonymity.
Proof. By Lemma 4.7 we have PX = Pan(X). Moreover, by Lemma 4.4, an(X) is strongly anonymous. This proves strong
anonymity ofX: recall that strong anonymity is a property defined in terms of traces (Definition 3.8). 
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Example 4.12 (Dining Cryptographers). We demonstrate our proofmethod via simulations by applying it to theDC protocol.
Let X = {x, y0, y1, y2} be the state space ofXDC. Its anonymized version an(XDC) has the same state space; for notational
convenience the state space of an(XDC) is denoted by X ′ = {x′, y0′, y1′, y2′}. It is verified by easy calculation that the
following function f : X → D(X ′) is a forward simulation from an(XDC) toXDC.
f (x) = [x′ 7→ 1] f (y0) = f (y1) = f (y2) =

y0′ 7→ p0p0+p1+p2
y1′ 7→ p1p0+p1+p2
y2′ 7→ p2p0+p1+p2

By Theorem 4.11 this proves (probabilistic) anonymity ofXDC, hence of the DC protocol.
Remark 4.13. For our proof method to work, choosing a right anonymity automaton to represent a given protocol is impor-
tant. Consider the following protocol (suggested by one of the referees): users in the setU = {0, 1, . . . , n− 1} pass a token
through the group, starting from 0 all the way to n− 1, each step being from the user i to the user i+ 1. Exactly one user is
allowed to write into an empty token. The adversary observes the movement of the token but not its content nor the action
of writing into it.
For simplicity let us assume n = 2. Although the protocol obviously satisfies strong anonymity, the representation below
on the left – which represents the natural order of actions – does not allow the application of our simulation-based method.
Such a problem can be always mended by ‘‘moving up actor actions’’; i.e. transformation into an automaton where an ac-
tor action is always the first action to be taken. Above on the right is such an automaton, to which our proof method is
successfully applied.
5. Verifying probable innocence via probabilistic simulations
In this section we present a simulation-based proof method for the weaker notion of probable innocence. Although the
basic idea is similar to that in the last section for strong anonymity, there are certain differences as well. Most notably, now
we have to find a simulation fromX to its ‘‘innocent version’’ inno(X); this is in the opposite direction of what we do for
strong anonymity.
The basic scenario is as follows.
(1) We model an anonymizing protocol as an anonymity automatonX.
(2) We construct the innocent version inno(X) ofX. Here it is not much of our concern whether inno(X) satisfies probable
innocence or not. Rather inno(X) is thought of as the automaton describing the upper bound of admissible information
leakage on who is the culprit. In fact, by examining the construction of inno(X), we can prove that
PX v Pinno(X) =⇒ X satisfies probable innocence. (9)
(3) We find a simulation fromX to inno(X). By soundness theorem this yields trace inclusion PX v Pinno(X), which by (9)
proves thatX satisfies probable innocence.
Although this scenario is somewhat different from the one for strong anonymity (or for non-deterministic trace
anonymity [27,28]), they are the same in that:
• we model a (trace-based) anonymity property as the ‘‘idealized version’’ ofX;
• by finding a simulation and then appealing to soundness theorem, we show that the property is preserved from the
idealized version to the originalX.
Therein the construction of the ‘‘idealized version ofX’’ must be much tailored to the specific property to be verified.
5.1. ‘‘Innocent’’ automaton inno(X)
We describe the construction of the innocent version inno(X) of a given anonymity automaton X. To illustrate the
intuition, let us assume that the a priori suspicion is uniformly distributed, that is, ri = 1/n whereU = {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}.
The automaton inno(X) is obtained by replacing actor actions inX as follows: compare it with (5).
(10)
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There is an obvious problem in this definition: the resulting inno(X) may not be an anonymity automaton, since the
probabilities q/2 appearing n times can add up to more than 1. We shall call such an automaton an extended anonymity
automaton.
Definition 5.1 (Extended Anonymity Automata). An extended anonymity automaton (X,U,O, c, s) is the same thing as an
anonymity automaton (Definition 3.1), except for the fact that c is a function of the type
X −→ V(A× {X} +A× X)
rather than X → D(A× {X} +A× X). Here the operation V is such that11
VY = [0,∞]Y = {d : Y → [0,∞]}. (11)
The operation V canonically extends to a monad, which we shall call the valuation monad.
Given an extended anonymity automatonX, its trace semantics
PX ∈ V(A+) (12)
is defined exactly in the same way as for anonymity automata (Definition 3.3).
Given an anonymity automaton X, it can be thought of also as an extended anonymity automaton because there is an
inclusion mapDY ↪→ VY :
X
c→ D(A× {X} +A× X) ↪→ V(A× {X} +A× X). (13)
Thereforewe are overriding the notation PX in (12). This is not a problem, since for an anonymity automatonX the following
two trace semantics obviously coincide.
• Its trace semantics (Definition 3.3) as an anonymity automaton, and
• the trace semantics of the extended anonymity automaton induced by (13).
Before giving a formal definition of inno(X), note that the core inequality (3) in the definition of probable innocence is
equivalent to the following one, which uses the a-priori distribution of suspicion (ri)i∈U from (4):
PX( [act(i)] ∩ [Eo] ) ≤ (n− 1)ri1+ (n− 2)ri · PX
((⋃
j∈U
[act(j)]
)
∩ [Eo]
)
. (14)
The equivalence is shown by the following easy calculation:
(n− 1) PX( [act(i)] )
PX(
⋃
j6=i
[act(j)] ) ≥
PX( [act(i)] | [Eo] )
PX(
⋃
j6=i
[act(j)] | [Eo] )
⇐⇒ (n− 1)ri∑
j6=i
rj
≥ PX( [act(i)] | [Eo] )
PX(
⋃
j6=i
[act(j)] | [Eo] )
⇐⇒ (n− 1)ri
1− ri ≥
PX( [act(i)] | [Eo] )
PX(
⋃
j6=i
[act(j)] | [Eo] )
⇐⇒ PX( [act(i)] | [Eo] ) ≤ (n− 1)ri1− ri · PX
(⋃
j6=i
[act(j)] | [Eo]
)
⇐⇒
(
1+ (n− 1)ri
1− ri
)
PX( [act(i)] | [Eo] ) ≤ (n− 1)ri1− ri · PX
(⋃
j∈U
[act(j)] | [Eo]
)
⇐⇒ 1+ (n− 2)ri
1− ri ·
PX( [act(i)] ∩ [Eo] )
PX( [Eo] ) ≤
(n− 1)ri
1− ri ·
PX(
⋃
j∈U
[act(j)] ∩ [Eo] )
PX( [Eo] ) ,
from which (14) follows immediately.
11 The range of d ∈ VY is [0,∞] including∞. This choice is made because, in order to apply the coalgebraic theory of traces and simulations, VY needs
to carry a Cppo-structure. In particular, any increasing ω-chain in VY must have its upper bound in VY .
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Definition 5.2 (Anonymity Automaton inno(X)). Given an anonymity automatonX = (X,U,O, c, s), its innocent version
inno(X) is an extended anonymity automaton given by the 5-tuple (X,U,O, c inno, s), where c inno is defined as follows. For
each x ∈ X ,
c inno(x)(act(i), u) = (n− 1)ri
1+ (n− 2)ri ·
∑
j∈U
c(x)(act(j), u)
for i ∈ U and u ∈ {X} + X ,
c inno(x)(o, u) = c(x)(o, u) for o ∈ O and u ∈ {X} + X .
The coefficient (n− 1)ri/(1+ (n− 2)ri) comes from the inequality (14). The definition agrees with the informal description
(10) when the a-priori suspicion (ri)i∈U is uniform.
5.2. Probable innocence via simulations
The intuition about the automaton inno(X) is that it represents the upper bound of admissible information leak. This
intuition is made precise in the following lemma, which is a crucial step in our simulation-based proof method for probable
innocence.
Lemma 5.3. If we have
PX v Pinno(X) that is, ∀Ea ∈ A+. PX(Ea) ≤ Pinno(X)(Ea),
then the anonymity automatonX satisfies probable innocence (Definition 3.11).
Proof. By calculation much like the one which shows the equality (6) in the proof of Lemma 4.4, we obtain the following.
Pinno(X)( [Eo] ∩ [act(i)] ) = (n− 1)ri1+ (n− 2)ri ·
∑
j∈U
PX( [Eo] ∩ [act(j)] ) (15)
By assumption, we have
PX( [Eo] ∩ [act(i)] ) ≤ Pinno(X)( [Eo] ∩ [act(i)] ),
which, together with (15), derives (14). 
The assumption of Lemma 5.3 – trace inclusion PX v Pinno(X) – shall be shown by finding a probabilistic simulation. Now
that inno(X) is an extended anonymity automaton, we have to adapt the notion of probabilistic simulation and its soundness
result to the extended setting. In terms of the generic theory in [20,23], this corresponds to changing the parameter T from
D to V .
Definition 5.4 (Forward/Backward Simulations, Extended). Let X and Y be extended anonymity automata. A forward (or
backward) simulation from X to Y is the same thing as a forward (or backward) simulation for anonymity automata
(Definition 4.5), except that
• we have now V in place ofD , and
• the inequalities are interpreted in [0,∞] rather than in [0, 1].
For example, a forward simulation fromX to Y is a function
f : Y −→ VX
which satisfies suitable inequalities as in Definition 4.5.
Theorem 5.5 (Soundness of Simulations, Extended). If there is a forward or backward simulation from an extended anonymity
automatonX to another Y, then we have trace inclusion
PX v PY, that is, ∀Ea ∈ A+. PX(Ea) ≤ PY(Ea).
Proof. The general, coalgebraic theory of traces [20,23] applies to the choice of parameters T = V and F = A×{X}+A× ,
in which case the coalgebraic notion of (T , F)-system instantiates to extended anonymity automata. Moreover, the coalge-
braic notions of trace semantics and simulation coincide with the corresponding notions for extended anonymity automata
(Definitions 5.1 and 5.4). Therefore the statement is an instance of the general soundness theorem [20, Theorem 6.1]. 
Theorem 5.6 (Probable Innocence via Simulations). If there exists a forward or backward simulation fromX to inno(X), then
X satisfies probable innocence.
Proof. By the soundness theorem (Theorem 5.5) we have PX v Pinno(X); by Lemma 5.3 this implies X’s probable inno-
cence. 
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Fig. 1. Automata for the Crowds protocol.
5.3. Example: Crowds
We shall verify probable innocence of the Crowds protocol using our simulation-based method. We focus on a restricted
setting where:
• there is only one corrupt relay (this is for simplicity); and
• the a priori suspicion ri is uniform. This is to observe a certain coincidence (Proposition 5.7) between our analysis and
the original one made in [34]. The latter says: the inequality
N ≥ pf
pf − 12
(c + 1) (16)
and pf > 1/2 together is sufficient for Crowds to satisfy probable innocence. Here N is the number of all relays and c is
that of the corrupt ones, hence c = 1 now.
5.3.1. First modeling
Let us denote the set of users by U = [0, n − 1] = {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}. It is now the set of incorrupt relays, hence the
number of all relays is N = n+ 1. Our first, naive modeling of the Crowds protocol is as follows. On the left in Fig. 1 is this
automaton when n = 2.
• The state space is {x} + {y0, . . . , yn−1} + {z0, . . . , zn−1} + {zc}. The intuition is:
. x is the initial state;
. yi is the state where the user i is holding a message as its originator;
. zi is where the user i is holding the message as a relay; and
. zc is where the (only) corrupt user is in possession of the message.• The transitions from each state are:
. x
act(i)[ 1n ]−→ yi for each i ∈ [0, n− 1], since we assumed that the a-priori suspicion is uniform;
. yi
s(i,j)[ 1n+1 ]−→ zj for each i, j ∈ [0, n]. Here s(i, j) is an action that represents relaying a message from the user i to j. From
the state yi there is another transition yi
s(i,c)[ 1n+1 ]−→ zc where the message is sent to the corrupt relay;
. from the state zi a message is either
delivered to the intended recipient: zi
s(i,X)[1−pf ]−→ X; or
forwarded to another relay: zi
s(i,j)[ pfn+1 ]−→ zj for each j ∈ [0, n− 1] and zi
s(i,c)[ pfn+1 ]−→ zc .
The state zc has the same kind of transitions;• x is the initial state with probability 1.
5.3.2. Taking the closure to obtainX
Although the last one is a straightforward modeling of the protocol, many actions in it must be kept invisible to the
adversary. We replace these actions – namely the actions s(i, j) for each i, j ∈ [0, n− 1], those which do not involve c or X
– by the silent action τ . After that we have to get rid of τ ’s by taking the closure: for example a transition yi
s(j,c)−→ zc in the
closure is understood as a sequence of transitions
yi
τ−→ · · · τ−→ · s(j,c)−→ zc
combined as one. A (rather laborious, but) straightforward calculation derives the following automaton as the outcome.
Only its transitions are different from the original automaton:
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• the transitions from the initial state x (where only actor actions take place) remain the same;
• from the state yi, a message is either
. delivered to the intended recipient without going through the corrupt relay: yi
s(j,X)−→ X for each j ∈ [0, n − 1]. Note
that i and j need not be identical: a message originated by i can be passed around and finally delivered to the recipient
by j 6= i. Each of these transitions occurs with the probability 1−pfn+1−npf ; or
. passed to the corrupt relay: yi
s(j,c)−→ zc . The assigned probability is: n+1−(n−1)pf(n+1)(n+1−npf ) if i = j;
pf
(n+1)(n+1−npf ) if i 6= j;• from the state zi,
. zi
s(j,X)−→ X occurs with the probability n+1−2npf+(n−1)p
2
f
n+1−npf if i = j; with
pf−p2f
n+1−npf if i 6= j;
. zi
s(j,c)−→ zc occurs with the probability (n+1)pf−(n−1)p
2
f
(n+1)(n+1−npf ) if i = j; with
p2f
(n+1)(n+1−npf ) if i 6= j.
The transitions from the state zc remain the same as in the original, naive modeling.
The resulting ‘‘closure’’ automaton looks like the one in the center of Fig. 1. This is our anonymity automaton X for the
Crowd protocol.
5.3.3. Probable innocence by simulation
We shall denote the states of inno(X) by x′, y′i, z
′
i and z
′
c , making clear their correspondence to the states ofX – this is
the same convention as in Example 4.12. The innocent version inno(X) is obtained fromX by distributing the probability
for each actor action to others (Definition 5.2). We assumed that ri = 1/n for each i ∈ [0, n − 1]; hence the coefficient in
Definition 5.2 is now
(n− 1)ri
1+ (n− 2)ri =
1
2
. (17)
Therefore in the automaton inno(X), the transitions from the initial state x′ are: x′
act(j)[ 12n ]−→ y′i for each i, j ∈ [0, n − 1]. The
automaton on the right in Fig. 1 is inno(X)when n = 2.12
Let us find a simulation fromX to inno(X), which by Theorem 5.6 guarantees probable innocence. Although it seemed
impossible for us to find a forward simulation, there is a natural candidate for a backward simulation. Namely, it is a function
b : {x, y0, . . . } → D{x′, y′0, . . . } (see Definition 4.5) defined as follows.
b(x) = [x′ 7→ 1],
b(yi) = [y′j 7→ 1/2]j∈[0,n−1] for each i ∈ [0, n− 1],
b(zi) = [z ′j 7→ 1/2]j∈[0,n−1] for each i ∈ [0, n− 1],
b(zc) = [z ′c 7→ 1].
Here the value 1/2 seems to come from (17). Some calculation shows the following.
Proposition 5.7. The function b defined above is a backward simulation fromX to inno(X), if and only if the parameters n and
pf satisfy pf > 1/2 and the inequality
n ≥ pf +
1
2
pf − 12
, that is N = n+ 1 ≥ pf
pf − 12
(1+ 1).
By Theorem 5.6,X satisfies probable innocence if these inequalities are satisfied. 
The latter inequality is exactly the inequality (16) taken from [34]. Thuswe have reproduced the analysis in [34] bymeans
of simulations.
6. Related work
6.1. Probabilistic non-interference
In the theory of programming languages, the property of non-interference [30] has attracted much attention. Intuitively,
a program C satisfies non-interference if there is no insecure information flow from variables with high confidentiality (high
variables) to those with low confidentiality (low variables).
12 Although the automata when n = 2 are depicted for illustration, note that they do not satisfy probable innocence. In particular, no choice of pf satisfies
the key inequality N ≥ pfpf −1/2 (c + 1) in [34] if c = 1 and N = n+ 1 = 3.
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Let us put it slightly more formally. Assume that twomemory statesµ and ν differ only in low variables (µ =L ν). Here a
memory state is a list of pairs of a variable name and a value (such as [H=0,L=0]). Non-interference of a program C requires
that the execution of C with the initial memory state µ is observationally indistinguishable from that with ν. In particular,
if µ′ and ν ′ are the memory states after these executions, respectively, then they have to agree on low variables:
µ =L ν, µ C; µ′, ν C; ν ′ =⇒ µ′ =L ν ′.
A possible variant of the formal definition concerns C ’s termination as well.
Volpano and Smith [45] noticed the importance of probabilistic aspects in non-interference. The leading example is in a
simple programming language which has themulti-threading construct C | C ′ which denotes running two threads C and C ′
in parallel, in an interleavingmanner. Even though there is no explicit probabilistic construct in the language, a probabilistic
scheduler – a mechanism that determines which thread to execute first – introduces probability in an operational model.
In [45] a simple example is presented in which insecure information flow emerges only in a probabilistic setting (but not in
a non-deterministic setting).
A definition of probabilistic non-interference (disregarding termination) can be presented as follows. Let µH , νH be
memory states of high variables; µL, µ′L be states of low variables. A program C satisfies probabilistic non-interference
if, for every µH , νH , µL and µ′L,
Pr(µL
C
; µ′L | initial high-memory is µH)
= Pr(µL C; µ′L | initial high-memory is νH).
Now notice the similarity to the notion of strong anonymity (Definition 2.1). We can think of the change of low-memory
µL
C
; µ′L as an ‘‘observation’’; and the initial high-memory as a ‘‘culprit’’; i.e. the information that we want to disguise. This
similarity between the two notions – (strong) probabilistic anonymity and probabilistic non-interference – suggests that a
technique to ensure one of these properties can be used to ensure the other property.
Use of type systems is a standard technique to ensure that a certain piece of program satisfies a certain desirable property,
such as non-interference. A type system typically has typing rules, and soundness theorem stating: if a program C is typable
– meaning that we can derive a typing judgment for C using the given rules – then C satisfies the desired property. One big
advantage of the type-based approach is that type systems are often accompanied with typing algorithms that effectively
determine whether a program is typable or not.
For probabilistic non-interference, a couple of type systems have been proposed [45,36]. They are in principle extensions
of the type system in [42] that ensures non-deterministic notion of non-interference. For example, the following program
with an obvious (but indirect) insecure information flow
if H=0 then L=0 else L=1; (18)
is typable in none of the type systems in [42,45,36]. Moreover, any program containing this piece is not typable either,
because of the compositional way of type derivation in these type systems.
Because of this fact the type systems from [45,36] do not seemwidely applicable to verification of anonymizing protocols.
Consider the example of Dining Cryptographers; a natural representation of the protocol as a program should include a piece
like (18) expressing ‘‘if a cryptographer is the payer, then she lies on her announcement’’. Therefore such a program for DC
is not typable.
In the DC protocol each cryptographer’s behavior is certainly influenced by the information to be hidden; this is why
the type systems from [45,36] do not seem to apply. Nevertheless, when three cryptographers are ‘‘composed’’ in the way
prescribed by the protocol, theymanage to hidewho is the payer. In this sense, broken anonymity is not compositional. A type
system which is applicable to verification of anonymizing protocols needs to suitably address such a non-compositional
phenomenon. However potential complexity of such a type system would make it harder to come up with a useful typing
algorithm.
6.2. Process algebraic techniques
In the current work we have presented anonymizing protocols in the form of automata, or transition systems. Using
process algebraic terms or process terms – such as P +Q for ‘‘non-deterministic choice between P and Q ’’ – is another way of
expressing processes such as anonymizing protocols. In fact, a process term induces a transition system via the structural
operational semantics of the process algebra [2], hence a process algebra can be seen as a ‘‘programming language’’ which
denotes transition systems.
One merit of using process algebras is that an algebraic structure in process terms often aids reasoning about properties
of the term (more precisely, properties of the automaton denoted by the term). For example, we can employ inductive
reasoning on the (inductive) construction of process terms. Many tools are available for analyzing properties of process
terms.
Process algebraic techniques have been successfully applied in many anonymity applications. In [12], the MUTE
anonymous file-sharing system [35] is analyzed by representing the protocol as a pi-calculus term. The analysis led to
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discovery of a flaw, which can be detected by the ABC bisimulation checker [6] for the pi-calculus. A detailed account of
the flaw is in [14]. In [15] a general framework for automatic checking of anonymity is proposed; the framework is based
on the process algebra µCRL. However, all the work mentioned here are done in non-deterministic settings. A probabilistic
framework of such a kind which would aid automatic error-detection/verification of anonymity is one interesting direction
of future work.
The probabilistic pi-calculus [25,32] is a process algebra that can model probabilistic choices. A process term in that
calculus yields a probabilistic automaton [39] as its operational model. It is used to model anonymity protocols in [5]. In
a similar direction, the recent work [7] uses a variant of CCS with an additional operator for probabilistic choices.
6.3. Systems with both non-determinism and probability
The importance of having both of non-deterministic and probabilistic branching in system verification has been claimed
by many authors, such as [38]; also in anonymity applications [31]. However our current method cannot handle this
combination due to the lack of a suitable coalgebraic framework.
In fact the combination of non-deterministic and probabilistic branching is a notoriously difficult one from a theoretical
point of view [11,44,43]:manymathematical tools that are useful in a purely non-deterministic or probabilistic setting cease
to work in the presence of both. Hence we take it as a fundamental and important challenge to find a suitable coalgebraic
framework that accommodates the combined branching.
The notion of probabilistic automaton [39] is one of the standard models for probabilistic processes; it has both non-
deterministic and probabilistic branchings. Trace semantics and simulations for probabilistic automata are studied in [38].
Soundness theorem – existence of a simulation yields trace inclusion – is also shown there.
However, one should be aware that the notion of ‘‘trace inclusion’’ in [38] is different from that in the current work.
In [38], trace semantics PX for a probabilistic automatonX is given by a set of probability distributions over lists on actions.
An intuitive understanding is: PX is the set of all the possible probabilistic behavior of X, taken over all the choices of
schedulers — mechanisms which resolve non-deterministic choices. Then the trace inclusion relation PX v PY is defined
to be simply the set inclusion PX ⊆ PY . Therefore, in the setting of [38], trace inclusion does not refer to the magnitude of
probabilities (such as ‘‘Y yields a list Eawithmore probability thanX does’’). This is different from our notion of trace inclusion
used in this paper. It is not clear whether simulations and trace semantics in [38] are useful in our current application of
probabilistic anonymity.
The presence of schedulers causes another problem: it is just easy to think of a scheduler which collaborates with the
adversary and makes anonymity fail. For example, suppose that we have an implementation of the DC protocol where we
have a scheduler that resolves the non-deterministic choice on which cryptographer makes her announcement (agree or
disagree) first. Then we can think of a scheduler which always put the payer’s announcement in the last place. In fact, Tom
Chothia [13] found out that this is how the Fedora JVM scheduler works for a certain implementation of DC in Java. There
have been some works dealing with this problem. The work [16] proposes a class of admissible schedulers whose choices
do not depend on the information to be disguised. In the work [7], a scheduler is explicitly written down as a process term;
the designer of a protocol has control – in syntactic means – of which actions/probabilistic choices should be visible to a
scheduler.
7. Conclusion and future work
We have extended the simulation-based proof method [28,27] for non-deterministic anonymity to apply to the notion
of strong probabilistic anonymity [5]. For the extension, we have exploited a generic theory of traces and simulations [20,
23] in which the difference between non-determinism and probability is just a different choice of a parameter. Additionally
a simulation-based proof method for the weaker notion of probable innocence is introduced.
TheDC example in this paper fails to demonstrate the true potentiality of our proofmethod. For this small example, direct
calculation of trace distribution is not hard. A real benefit would arise in theorem-proving anonymity of an unboundedly
large system (whichwe cannotmodel-check). In fact, the non-deterministic version of our proofmethod is used to theorem-
prove anonymity of a voting protocol with an arbitrary number of voters [27]. Such a probabilistic case study is currently
missing.
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